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INTRODUCTION
Albert Einstein wrote, “Most of the fundamental ideas of science
are essentially simple, and may, as a rule, be expressed in a language
comprehensible to everyone.”1 If that is true of scientific ideas, surely
it is true of legal ideas.2 Sadly this has not proved true. Legal
writing—especially legislative drafting3—is marred by obscurity.
Reliance on loose verbs and excess words4 has made simple ideas
difficult to understand and complex ideas nearly impossible to
understand.5 This obscurity is especially flagrant because the purpose

1

BRYAN A. GARNER, MODERN AMERICAN USAGE 630-631 (3d ed. 2009)
(quoting ALBERT EINSTEIN, THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICS 29 (1938)).
2
GARNER, supra note 1, at 631.
3
BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER ON LANGUAGE AND WRITING 171 (1st ed. 2009)
(citing MICHAEL ZANDER, THE LAW-MAKING PROCESS 22 (2d ed. 1985)).
4
GARNER, supra note 3, at 174 (“Few reforms would improve legal drafting
more than if drafters were to begin paying closer attention to the verbs by which they
set forth duties, rights, prohibitions, and entitlements.”).
5
GARNER, supra note 1, at 582.
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of legislative drafting is to say “in the plainest language, with the
simplest, fewest, and fittest words, precisely what” the law means.6
Yet obscurity is a hallmark of Congress. In 1948, the average
length of bills that made it through Congress was two and a half pages;
today it is twenty.7 This is not new: in 1857, Lord Campbell criticized
a poorly drafted statute as “an ill-penned enactment . . . putting Judges
in the embarrassing situation of being bound to make sense out of
nonsense, and to reconcile what is irreconcilable.”8 Nor is this
necessary9: “With some hard work,” drafters can transform “all-butinscrutable” texts into straightforward statutes.10
The Clayton Antitrust Act11 is one such “all-but-inscrutable”
statute. It prohibits certain conduct that Congress deems
anticompetitive: Section 2 prohibits price discrimination,12 Section 3
prohibits exclusive dealing contracts, 13 and Section 7 prohibits
mergers that “lessen competition” or “tend to create a monopoly.”14 In
suits against corporations, Section 12 provides plaintiffs with venue
and service-of-process options.15 It states:
6

GARNER, supra note 3, at 169 (quoting J.G. Mackay, Introduction to an Essay
on the Art of Legal Composition Commonly Called Drafting, 3 LAW Q. REV. 326,
326 (1887)).
7
Outrageous Bills, THE ECONOMIST, November 23, 2013, at 32. According to
Donald Richie of the Sentae Historical Office, a staffer who took a copy of the 2400page Affordable Care Act that the Senate Passed on Christmas Eve 2009 had to
remove it from his luggage or face an excessive-baggage charge.
8
GARNER, supra note 3, at 170 (citing Fell v. Burchett, 7 E. & B. 537, 539
(1857). Lord Campbell criticized a poorly drafted statute as “an ill-penned enactment
. . . putting Judges in the embarrassing situation of being bound to make sense out of
nonsense, and to reconcile what is irreconcilable.” Id.
9
Dobson v. C.I.R., 320 U.S. 489, 495 (1943) (“[T]he tax code can never be
made simple, but we can try to avoid making it needlessly complex.”).
10
GARNER, supra note 1, at 631.
11
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-38 (1914).
12
Id. § 13.
13
Id. § 14.
14
Id. § 18.
15
Id. § 22.
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Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws
against a corporation may be brought not only in the judicial
district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district
wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process
in such cases may be served in the district of which it is an
inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.
Congress’s careless drafting raises a question: does the service-ofprocess clause apply to all antitrust cases, or is it limited to those cases
in which a plaintiff establishes venue under Section 12’s venue clause?
The Seventh Circuit correctly answered this question in KM
Enterprises, Inc. v. Global Traffic Technologies, Inc.16 The court held
that Section 12 “must be read as a package deal. To avail oneself of the
privilege of nationwide service of process, a plaintiff must satisfy the
venue provisions of Section 12’s first clause.”17 In other words,
plaintiffs cannot combine Section 12’s liberal service-of-process
provision with Section 1391’s liberal venue provision. While the court
found Section 12’s language too ambiguous to rely on a plain-meaning
rationale, it found nothing in Section 12’s “text, purpose, or history” to
compel the mix-and-match approach.18
This Comment argues that the Seventh Circuit reached the right
result for the right reasons. Part I provides a background on the
relationship between federal personal-jurisdiction and venue
provisions and the Clayton Act’s specific-to-antitrust personaljurisdiction and venue provisions. Part I also provides a brief history
of private antitrust litigation and establishes the facts underlying KM
Enterprises, Inc. Part II focuses on the two competing readings of
Section 12. It identifies the lines of reasoning that courts have used to
reach these two readings. And Part III argues that the Seventh Circuit
reached the right result for the right reason. It argues that Congress’s
obscure drafting demands a more careful and nuanced analysis. And it
16

KM Enterprises, Inc. v. Global Traffic Technologies, Inc., 725 F.3d 718 (7th
Cir. 2013).
17
Id. at 730.
18
Id.

3
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argues that Judge Wood’s careful reasoning and plain, precise writing
is a model for the plain-language reform that the legal profession
sorely needs.19
I. BACKGROUND
Judge Learned Hand observed that the Clayton Act, which
Congress passed in 1914, was designed “to permit the plaintiff to sue
the defendant wherever he could catch him.”20 This observation
notwithstanding, in order to sue in federal court, a plaintiff must
establish, among other things, that the court has personal jurisdiction
over the defendant and that venue is proper.21 In addition to the
general provisions found in federal law, Section 12 of the Clayton Act
has its own personal-jurisdiction and venue provisions that apply to
private plaintiffs bringing suits against corporate defendants. The
relationship between these general principles and the Clayton Act’s
specific provisions “has become tangled over the years.”22
A. General Federal Personal-Jurisdiction and Venue Principles
Start with personal jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction refers to a
court’s power over the parties,23 and it derives from the state, from the
defendant’s contacts with the state, and the reasonableness of the
assertion of judicial authority.24 The “mechanics for asserting personal

19

GARNER, supra note 3, at 300 (“It is hardly an overstatement to say that
plain-language reform is among the most important issues confronting the legal
profession. . . . We must learn to communicate simply and directly.”).
20
Thorburn v. Gates, 225 F. 613, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
21
Adam B. Perry, Which Cases Are “Such Cases”: Interpreting and Applying
Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1184 (2007).
22
KM Enterprises, Inc. v. Global Traffic Technologies, Inc., 725 F.3d 718, 723
(7th Cir. 2013).
23
Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979).
24
KM Enterprises, Inc., 725 F.3d at 723.
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jurisdiction”25 are found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k),26
which provides:
(1) In General. Serving a summons or filing a waiver of
service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant:
(A) who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of
general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is
located;
(B) who is a party joined under Rule 14 or 19 and is
served within a judicial district of the United States and not
more than 100 miles from where the summons was issued; or
(C) when authorized by a federal statute.
(2) Federal Claims Outside State-Court Jurisdiction. For a
claim that arises under federal law, serving a summons or
filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction
over a defendant if:
(A) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any
state’s court of general jurisdiction; and
(B) exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United
States Constitution and laws.27
Thus, subpart 1(A) provides that, subject to the constitutional dueprocess limitations protected by the minimum-contacts analysis,28
federal personal jurisdiction is proper whenever the defendant would
be amenable to suit under the laws of the state in which the federal
court sits.29 Subpart 1(C) provides that personal jurisdiction is proper
if authorized by a federal statute, also subject to due-process
limitations.30

25

Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k).
27
Id. §§ (1)-(2).
28
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
29
KM Enterprises, Inc., 725 F.3d at 723 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A)).
30
Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(C)).
26

5
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Unlike personal jurisdiction, which governs a court’s power over
a defendant, venue establishes which judicial district (among those
that have personal jurisdiction) should hear the suit.31 Venue is a
“creature of statute”32 that limits the number of potential districts
where a defendant may be called to those that are fair and reasonably
convenient.33 28 U.S.C. § 1391, the general federal venue statute,
provides that venue is proper in:
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all
defendants are residents of the State in which the district is
located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events
or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a
substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action
is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be
brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in
which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal
jurisdiction with respect to such action.34
The statute provides that corporate defendants are deemed to
“reside” in “any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to
the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in
question.”35 And in states with multiple judicial districts—like
Illinois—the statute limits a corporation’s residency to “any district in
that State within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to
personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State, and, if there
is no such district . . . in the district within which it has the most
significant contacts.”36
31

Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979).
KM Enterprises, Inc., 725 F.3d at 724.
33
Leroy, 443 U.S. at 180.
34
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (Date).
35
Id. § 1391(c)(2).
36
Id. § 1391(d).
32

6
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B. The Clayton Act’s Specific-to-Antitrust Provisions
Rule 4(K) and Section 1391 govern personal jurisdiction and
venue generally. But, as Rule 4(k)(1(C) allows, Congress occasionally
provides special federal rules for establishing personal jurisdiction or
venue, or both.37 The Clayton Act does just that. Section 12 states:
Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws
against a corporation may be brought not only in the judicial
district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district
wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process
in such cases may be served in the district of which it is an
inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.38
Section 12 provides for both personal jurisdiction and venue in
the case of a corporate defendant. The first clause sets venue anywhere
the corporation is an “inhabitant,” is “found,” or “transacts
business.”39 The second clause provides nationwide service of process
and, therefore, nationwide personal jurisdiction.40
Congress’s ambiguous drafting raises a question: must Section
12’s venue and service-of-process provisions be read together as an
integrated whole? If a plaintiff takes advantage of Section 12’s
nationwide service-of-process provision—i.e., Section 12’s nationwide
personal-jurisdiction provision—must he establish venue under
Section 12 as well? Or may he “mix and match,”41 relying on Section
12 for personal jurisdiction after he established venue under Section
1391? The Seventh Circuit answered this question in KM Enterprises,
Inc. and correctly rejected the mix-and-match scheme.
37

FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(C).
15 U.S.C. § 22 (1914).
39
Id.
40
See, e.g., Carrier Corp. v. Outokumpu Oy, 673 F.3d 430, 449 (6th Cir. 2012);
GTE New Media Servs., Inc., v. Bell S. Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1350 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
41
KM Enterprises, Inc. v. Global Traffic Technologies, Inc., 725 F.3d 718, 725
(7th Cir. 2013).
38

7
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C. The Facts: KM Enterprises, Inc. v. Global Traffic Technologies,
Inc.
KM Enterprises, Inc. (KME) is an Illinois corporation.42 Global
Traffic Technologies, Inc. and its subsidiary, Global Traffic
Technologies, LLC (collectively GTT) are Delaware entities
headquartered in Minnesota.43 The companies are competitors in a
specialized market for devices that allow emergency vehicles to
preempt traffic lights and pass through intersections with, rather than
against, the light.44 There are two primary traffic-signal-interrupter
technologies: one relies on optical signals, and the other uses GPS
signals.45 KME sued GTT in the Southern District of Illinois, alleging
violations of, among other things, the Clayton Act.46
In its suit—the latest in a series of legal disputes47 between the
rivals—KME alleged that GTT improperly persuades public agencies
to specify GTT’s technology when drafting public contract
requirements.48 According to KME, this tactic ensures that contracts
will be awarded to bidders who will install GTT’s units.49 But that is
not all: KME further alleged that GTT falsely informs these bidders
that the optical signals are no longer available and instead offers a
“dual” unit that houses both optical and GPS technology.50 According
42

Id. at 721.
Id. at 721-722.
44
Id. at 722.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. In 2010, GTT filed a patent-infringement suit against KME in the District
of Minnesota. Id. KME then filed a separate suit, also in the District of Minnesota,
which was consolidated with the patent case. Id. Next, KME sued the New York
State Department of Transportation and its commissioner twice in 2011 in the
Eastern District of New York; these suits challenged the Department’s award of
traffic-preemption contracts to vendors of GTT technology. Id. KME followed that
suit with this suit, which it filed in the Southern District of Illinois. Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
43

8
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to KME, this bait-and-switch harms competition in the GPS market by
locking purchasers into GTT’s technology.51
None of GTT’s activity, however, took place in Illinois.52 While
GTT had equipped several dozen traffic intersections within the
Southern District of Illinois, none of the intersections had GTT’s dual
units—the core of KME’s Clayton Act allegations.53 While GTT made
six direct sales to buyers within the district over a four-year period,
these sales amounted to .002% of its sales during that time.54 GTT
does not install or maintain its equipment in the district; it does not
maintain offices or agents in the district; and it does not directly
promote its products in the district.55 And the public procurement
process by which traffic-signal-interrupter contracts are awarded takes
place in Springfield (Central District of Illinois), while the third-party
distributor that supplies GTT’s products is located in Chicago
(Northern District of Illinois).56
GTT moved to dismiss based on (among other things) improper
venue.57 The district court granted its motion on venue grounds,
reasoning that GTT’s peripheral contacts with the district could not
support venue under Section 1391.58 KME appealed, arguing that
GTT’s contacts were sufficient to support venue under Section 1391.59
In so doing, KME “advance[d] a theory that would allow it to shortcircuit the venue analysis by mixing and matching among the serviceof-process and venue provisions of Section 12 and Section 1391.”60

51

Id.
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 722-723.
56
Id. at 722.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 723.
59
Id.
60
Id. This was significant because GTT’s contacts with the Southern District of
Illinois were insufficient to establish venue under Section 12.
52

9
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II. THREE READINGS AND TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF ONE POORLY
DRAFTED STATUTE
Courts have read Section 12 in either of two ways. The first
reading would allow plaintiffs to establish personal jurisdiction under
Section 12’s nationwide service-of-process provision and then
establish venue through either Section 1391 or Section 12. The
Seventh Circuit referred to this as the “decoupled” reading because it
allows plaintiffs to decouple Section 12’s first clause from its
second.61 This Comment will do the same. The second reading, which
this Comment refers to as an “integrated”62 reading, requires plaintiffs
to satisfy venue under Section 12 in order to use its liberal service-ofprocess provision. In other words, Section 12’s clauses are an
integrated whole. Courts have used three lines of reasoning to reach
these two competing readings. This Section identifies and explores
these competing and often overlapping analyses.
A. The Decoupled Reading
The Third63 and Ninth64 Circuits take a decoupled reading of
Section 12’s venue and service-of-process requirements. The Ninth
Circuit became the first federal court of appeals to address this issue in
Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Electric Co.65 The case involved a lawsuit
between Go-Video, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in Arizona, and a Japanese electronics trade association made
up of multiple manufacturing companies.66 Go Video sued the foreign
companies for alleged violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.67
Go-Video asserted a mix-and-match theory: it claimed that venue was
61

Id. at 725.
Perry, supra note 21, at 1198.
63
In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288 (3d Cir.
2004).
64
Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., Ltd., 885 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1989).
65
Id. at 1407.
66
Id.
67
Id.
62

10
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proper in Arizona under Section 1391(d) and then served process on
the Japanese defendants under Section 12 of the Clayton Act. 68 The
district court found that personal jurisdiction and venue were proper in
the District of Arizona under a decoupled reading of Section12; the
court held that the Japanese defendants’ aggregate contacts with the
United States were sufficient.69 The Japanese defendants appealed to
the Ninth Circuit, arguing that Section 12 ought to be read as an
integrated whole, requiring Go-Video to satisfy the venue clause of
Section 12, not just 1391.70 If the defendants were right, Go-Video
likely could not establish proper venue in the District of Arizona.71
Plaintiffs argued that “such cases” in the text of the Clayton Act
referred to all antitrust cases against a corporate defendant, not those
in which a litigant established venue under Section 12.72
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. It initially observed that the answer
was not clear from Section 12’s plain language but concluded that the
purpose of private antitrust enforcement supported a decoupled
reading of Section 12.73 Because specific venue provisions supplement
general venue provisions—i.e., Section 12 supplements rather than
replaces Section 1391—a plaintiff may properly satisfy venue under
either provision.74 The court also relied on Section 12’s legislative
history to support its decoupled conclusion.75 The court thus
concluded that Congress adopted Section 12 to “expan[d] the bounds
68

Id. at 1407-1408.
Id. at 1408.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. (“[A decoupled reading] is more closely in keeping with the manner in
which courts have traditionally defined the relationship between one statute’s
specific venue provision and the general federal venue statutes.”).
74 Id. at 1408-1410.
75
Id. at 1410-1411. The Court noted that the House introduced Section 12’s
venue provision to allow antitrust suits against a corporate defendant wherever it
could be found. Id. And the Senate added the service-of-process provision without
debate—specifically without any indication that it was intended to “be subject[] to
the section’s venue provision.” Id.
69

11
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of venue” and was therefore reluctant to construe Section 12 in a way
that would “limit[] the availability of the valued tool of worldwide
service of process.”76
The Third Circuit faced the same question and reached the same
result.77 The case, In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Litigation,
involved a class-action complaint78 that alleged that multiple foreign
and domestic defendants conspired to fix car-paint prices in the United
States over a seven-year period.79 The district court found personal
jurisdiction over the alien defendants, construing Section 12 as
authorizing worldwide service of process independently of its specific
venue provision.80 Two of the foreign defendants appealed the district
court’s personal-jurisdiction finding, arguing that the clauses must be
read as in integrated whole.81
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.82 Like the
Ninth Circuit in Go-Video, the Third Circuit concluded that Section
12’s text was not dispositive.83 The court relied on Go-Video, holding
that Section 12’s service-of-process provision “is independent of, and
does not require satisfaction of, the specific venue provision under
Section 12.”84 The court bolstered its conclusion by comparing its
construction of Section 12 to its construction of Section 27 of the
76

Id. at 1412. The court concluded that a decoupled view “is clearly the one
more consonant with the purpose of the Clayton Act and better comports with a
section designed to expand the reach of the antitrust laws and make it easier for
plaintiffs to sue for antitrust violations.”
77
In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288 (3d Cir. 2004).
78
Id. at 290. The U.S. Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation consolidated
sixty-three actions filed in five states. Id.
79
Id. at 290, n.1, 291.
80
Id. at 291; see In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1426,
2002 WL 31261330, at *6-10 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2002).
81
In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d at 290.
82
Id. at 305-306. Instead of relying on its own reading of Section 12, the court
“interprete[d] a passage in which antecedents and consequents are unclear by
reference to the content and purpose of the statute as a whole.”
83
Id. at 295-296.
84
Id. at 296-297.

12
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934.85 The Third Circuit took a broad
view of federal personal jurisdiction in the Section 27 context, holding
that “a federal court’s personal jurisdiction may be assessed on the
basis of the defendant’s national contacts when the plaintiff’s claim
rests on a federal statute authorizing nationwide service of process.”86
B. The Integrated Reading: Reaching the Right Result for the Wrong
Reasons
Before the Seventh Circuit’s decision in KM Enterprises, Inc., two
federal courts of appeal read Section 12’s clauses as an integrated
whole: the D.C. Circuit and the Second Circuit. The D.C. Circuit87
concluded that the clauses were integrated under a plain-meaning
analysis. Part III argues that this is an incomplete analysis. The Second
Circuit88 reached its integrated-whole conclusion on safer but still
dangerous grounds; it relied on a plain-meaning analysis and, in dicta,
further supported this conclusion with Section 12’s sparse legislative
history. The Seventh Circuit took the analysis one step further. It
agreed with the Third and Ninth Circuits that the text was not
dispositive, but it concluded that an integrated reading was proper
because it best fits with Congress’s purpose in drafting Section 12.
85

Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter
or rules and regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of such
chapter or rules and regulations, may be brought in any such district or in
the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts
business, and process in such cases may be served in any other district of
which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be
found.

15 U.S.C. § 78aa (Date) (emphasis added).
86
In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d at 298 (citing
Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 369 (3d Cir. 2002)).
87
GTE New Media Services Inc. v. Bell S. Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1350 (D.C.
Cir. 2000).
88
Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408 (2d Cir. 2005).

13
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Part III argues that the Seventh Circuit reached the right result for the
right reasons—Congress’s obscure drafting requires more than a plainmeaning analysis.
The D.C. and Second Circuits both rejected the mix-and-match
approach reading. In GTE New Media Services Inc. v. BellSouth Corp.,
a 2000 case decided by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the court
held that the two clauses had to be read as an integrated whole.89 The
court noted that the plaintiff did not establish that the defendants were
inhabitants of the district, could be found in the district, or transacted
business in the district, as required by Section 12’s venue provision.90
Plaintiff argued that this was not a precondition to using Section 12’s
worldwide service-of-process provision.91 The court disagreed. While
it acknowledged the plaintiff’s desire to read Section 12’s venue
provision expansively, it held that this desire did not justify
disregarding the venue clause entirely.92
“It seems quite unreasonable,” the court held, “to presume that
Congress would intentionally craft a two-pronged provision with a
superfluous first clause, ostensibly link the two provisions with the ‘in
such cases’ language, but nonetheless fail to indicate clearly anywhere
that it intended the first clause to be disposable.”93 The court
concluded that “[a] party seeking to take advantage of section 12’s
liberalized service provisions must follow the dictates of both of its
clauses. To read the statute otherwise would be to ignore its plain
meaning.”94
89

GTE New Media Services Inc., 199 F.3d at 1350.
Id. at 1351.
91
Id. at 1350.
92
Id. at 1351 (“A party seeking to take advantage of section 12’s liberalized
service provision must follow the dictates of both of its clauses. To read the statute
otherwise would be to ignore its plain meaning.”).
93
Id.
94
Id.; see also Management Insights, Inc. v. CIC Enterprises, Inc., 194 F.
Supp. 2d 520, 531-532 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (noting that decoupling section 12’s clauses
“completely eviscerates any semblance of a venue inquiry in antitrust cases
involving corporate defendants—a result this Court finds Congress could not have
intended.”).
90
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Likewise, in Daniel v. American Board of Emergency Medicine,
the Second Circuit interpreted Section 12 narrowly, reading the statute
as an integrated whole.95 There, the plaintiffs—a class of licensed
physicians—brought an antitrust suit in the Western District of New
York against two defendants incorporated in Michigan. The plaintiffs
claimed that the defendants “colluded to restrain trade in connection
with the practice of emergency medicine . . . and to monopolize or
attempt to monopolize the market for . . . eligible [emergency]
doctors.”96 The district court dismissed the claim for lack of
standing.97 On appeal, the Second Circuit joined the D.C. Circuit in
holding that “the plain language of Section 12 indicates that its service
of process provision applies (and, therefore, establishes personal
jurisdiction) only in cases in which its venue provision is satisfied.”98
In reaching this decision, the court focused on the plain meaning
of the word “such,” as in:
Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws
against a corporation may be brought not only in the judicial
district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district
wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process
in such cases may be served in the district of which it is an
inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.99
The court reasoned that because Congress placed the word “such”
soon after the semicolon in Section 12, and because the common
meaning of “such” is “having a quality already or just specified . . . of
the sort or degree previously indicated or implied, or previously

95

Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408 (2d Cir. 2005).
Id. at 414-417.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 423.
99
15 U.S.C. § 12 (Date) (emphasis added).
96
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characterized or described,” the two clauses had to be read as an
integrated whole.100
While the Daniel court found the plain meaning dispositive, it
nonetheless considered the Third and Ninth Circuit’s extra-textual
analyses.101 It agreed with the Third and Ninth Circuits that the
purpose of Section 12 was the “expansion of the bounds of venue.”102
But it echoed the Supreme Court’s admonition that “[i]n adopting
section 12 Congress was not willing to give plaintiffs free rein to haul
defendants hither and yon at their caprice.”103 The court concluded
that there was no evidence to support the conclusion that Congress
intended courts to split the two “provisions [and] combine the latter
with an expanded general venue statute enacted decades later.”104
The court then went on to compare Section 12’s venue and
service-of-process provisions to similar provisions in the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).105 The court
correctly noted that such comparisons are generally dangerous and,106
because each provision contains different statutory text, found the
100

Daniel, 428 F.3d at 424 (“The ‘quality’ of the cases specified in the
provision of Section 12 preceding the semicolon is not simply that they are antirust
cases . . . it is that they are antitrust cases against corporations brought in the
particular venues approved by Section 12. . . . It is ‘in such cases,’ . . . that Section
12 makes worldwide service of process available.”).
101
Id. at 425.
102
Id. (quoting Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., Ltd., 885 F.2d 1406, 1410
(9th Cir. 1989)).
103
United States v. Nat’l City Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. 573, 588 (1948),
superseded in part by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012).
104
Daniel, 428 F.3d at 425. The court observed that Congress adopted Section
12 to expand venue for antitrust lawsuits in light of restrictive general venue
provisions. Id. But Section 1391, the general venue provision, is no longer as
restrictive as it once was. Id. Thus, allowing a decoupled reading would essentially
eliminate the venue inquiry entirely. Id.
105
Id. at 426. Interestingly, the district court made identical comparisons in
reaching its decoupled reading of Section 12. Id.
106
Id. at 423 (citing Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529
U.S. 193, 204 (2000) (“[A]nalysis of specific venue provisions must be specific to
the statute.”)).
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comparison unhelpful.107 But it nonetheless found support for its
integrated-reading conclusion when comparing Section 12 with the
venue and personal-jurisdiction provisions of RICO.108 With RICO,
Congress chose to separate the venue and service-of-process
provisions into separate subsections.109 RICO’s service-of-process
section does not contain a limiting clause similar to Section 12’s “in
such cases,” which, according to the court, made clear that Congress
intended Section 1965(d) to apply to all cases brought under RICO.110
The court concluded that the language and organizational differences
between the Clayton Act and RICO make clear that “Congress was
expressly rendering independent under RICO concepts that it had
plainly linked under Clayton Act Section 12.”111
III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT REACHES THE RIGHT RESULT FOR THE
RIGHT REASONS
The Seventh Circuit joined the D.C. and Second Circuits in KM
Enterprises, Inc. by taking an integrated reading of Section 12.112 The
court began its analysis with the text: “As the Supreme Court has
instructed time and again, if ‘the language at issue has a plain and
unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case,
then that meaning controls and the court’s ‘inquiry must cease.’”113
While it agreed with the Second Circuit’s definition of “such,”114 the
107

Id. at 426.
Id. at 427 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a), (d) (2000)). The court noted that the
Clayton Act served as a model for RICO’s venue and personal-jurisdiction
provisions. Id.
109
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) (venue), (d) (service of process)).
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
KM Enterprises, Inc. v. Global Traffic Technologies, Inc., 725 F.3d 718,
730 (7th Cir. 2013).
113
Id. (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)).
114
“‘[H]aving a quality or just specified’; ‘of this or that character, quality, or
extent: of the sort or degree previously indicated or implied’; or ‘previously
characterized or described: aforementioned.’”
108

17

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2013

17

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 2

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 9, Issue 1

Fall 2013

Seventh Circuit noted “in such cases” does not specify the “quality” of
cases specified in the first clause.115 At a minimum, “such cases” must
refer to antitrust cases brought against corporations.116 But because the
venue clause is not written in adjectival terms—it provides that
antitrust cases “may be brought” in certain districts vs. antitrust cases
that “are brought in” those districts—it “is not apparent that these
provisions specify the ‘quality’ of the cases referred to in clause
two.”117 The court was thus “less confident [than the D.C. and Second
Circuits] that the text alone drives [the] result.” 118
But this did not convince the court that a decoupled reading was
appropriate. It noted that decoupling Section 12 creates textual
problems of its own: “If the clauses are not linked, then the venue
language is superfluous,”119 a result that courts generally disfavor.120
The court echoed the D.C. Circuit’s concern that “in order to decouple
Section 12’s venue and service-of-process provisions, we would have
to assume that Congress intentionally joined the two provisions with a
semicolon, but nevertheless intended for the second provision to
render the first ‘disposable.’”121

115

Id. at 729 (citing Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 424
(2d Cir. 2005)).
116
Id.
117
Id.; see also 14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3818 (3d ed. 2013) (“The [Second Circuit’s] decision
rests on the assumption that ‘such cases’ refers to antitrust cases against corporations
that are brought in the approved venues, but that is not a possible referent of ‘such
cases’ because those words nowhere appear in the clause preceding the semicolon.”)
(emphasis in original).
118
KM Enterprises, Inc., 725 F.3d at 729.
119
Id.
120
See, e.g., Astoria Fed’l Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112
(1991).
121
KM Enterprises, Inc., 725 F.3d at 729 (quoting GTE New Media Services
Inc. v. Bell S. Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 2000)); accord Go-Video, Inc.
v. Akai Elec. Co., Ltd., 885 F.2d 1406, 1413 (9th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that this
interpretation of Section 12 had the potential to render the venue provision “wholly
redundant.”).
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Worse still, the Seventh Circuit noted that a decoupled reading of
Section 12 “leads to some very odd results.”122 Such a decoupled
reading of Section 12 “renders the venue inquiry meaningless”
because venue is satisfied in every federal judicial district under
subsection (c)(2).123 According to the court, this result runs contrary to
Congress’s apparent intent in passing Sections 12 and 1391: that there
be “some limits on venue, in antitrust cases specifically and in
general.”124
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit concluded that, while Section 12’s
language is too ambiguous to rely on the D.C. and Second Circuit’s
plain-meaning rationale, the “practical effects of decoupling the
clauses of Section 12 are ultimately too bizarre and contrary to
Congress’s apparent intent for us to endorse.”125 “Thus,” the court
concluded, “Section 12 must be read as a package deal. To avail
oneself of the privilege of nationwide service of process, a plaintiff
must satisfy the venue provisions of Section 12’s first clause.”126
This is the right result, and the Seventh Circuit reached it for the
right reasons. The fact that Congress passed Section 12 in order to
expand venue in antitrust cases does not indicate that Congress wanted
nationwide venue. To the contrary, it created specific limits on
venue.127 And, for many corporations, these limits result in a pool of
122

KM Enterprises, Inc., 725 F.3d at 729 (citing Griffin v. Oceanic
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) (“[I]nterpretations of a statute [that]
would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations
consistent with the legislative purpose are available.”).
123
Id.
124
Id. (emphasis in original). The court elaborated: “Both statutes authorize
venue only when certain enumerated requirements are met, be it that the defendant
“transacts business” in the district, “resides” there, or something else. It would be
quite strange to read two statutes that place limits on venue in a manner that
eliminates those limits.” Id. at 729-730.
125
Id. at 730.
126
Id.
127
United States v. Nat’l City Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. 573, 588 (1948), superseded
in part by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012) (“In adopting § 12 Congress was not
willing to give plaintiffs free rein to haul defendants hither and yon at their
caprice.”).
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permissible districts much smaller than the entire United States. As the
Seventh Circuit noted, “If something in Section 12 compelled the mixand-match approach, then that is what we would follow. But we see
nothing in the text, purpose, or history of Section 12 that casts doubt
on the result we have reached.”128
CONCLUSION
It is unfortunate that Section 12’s text cannot be dispositive in
such a clear-cut issue.129 Indeed, it borders on absurdity that
Congress—whose job is to say “in the plainest language, with the
simplest, fewest, and fittest words, precisely what” the law means130—
could draft such a simple statute so poorly. But Judge Wood’s opinion
provides a silver lining: her careful reasoning and plain, precise
writing serve as e a model for the plain-language reform that the legal
profession sorely needs.131 Legislators, judges, and lawyers would do
well to follow suit.

128

KM Enterprises, Inc., 725 F.3d at 730.
See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Personal Jurisdiction & Venue in Private
Antitrust Actions in the Federal Courts: A Policy Analysis, 67 IOWA L. REV. 485
(1982) (Section 12 is best read as an integrated whole.).
130
GARNER, supra note 3, at 169.
131
Id. at 300 (“It is hardly an overstatement to say that plain-language reform is
among the most important issues confronting the legal profession. . . . We must learn
to communicate simply and directly.”).
129
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